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NOTE 
JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED? HOW THE PATIENT 
SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT MAY CURE 
FLORIDA’S PATIENTS’ RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT ADVERSE 
MEDICAL INCIDENTS (AMENDMENT 7) 
Kelly G. Dunberg* 
Abstract 
This Note addresses the impact of Florida’s Patients’ Right to Know 
About Adverse Medical Incidents (commonly known as Amendment 7) on 
the peer review process and the quality of healthcare in Florida. Enacted in 
2004 as an amendment to the Florida Constitution, Amendment 7 provides 
citizens access to records and reports of past adverse medical incidents 
involving doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers. Critics of 
Amendment 7 argue that peer review privilege protections are necessary to 
maintain high-quality healthcare in Florida, pointing to the need to 
encourage candid and vigorous evaluations by physicians of their 
colleagues. In contrast, Amendment 7 supporters argue that it provides 
Florida patients with valuable information to aid in their choice of 
physicians. 
While it is still too early to determine Amendment 7’s impact on the 
peer review system, and thus on the quality of healthcare systems 
statewide, any possible solution to counteract Amendment 7 would be 
beneficial to Florida patients. Under Amendment 7, healthcare providers 
likely will not critically analyze fellow physicians during peer review 
because of a lack of confidentiality and privilege protections. Peer review 
will no longer feature the full disclosure by specialized healthcare 
practitioners that is necessary for its maximum effectiveness. As a result, 
patients likely will suffer a decline in the quality of healthcare.  
Congress enacted the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act 
(PSQIA) in response to a startling finding in 1999 by the Institute of 
Medicine that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die annually in 
American hospitals due to medical errors. The PSQIA creates patient 
safety organizations (PSO) and the Network of Patient Safety Databases 
(NPSD), which enable healthcare providers to share reports of adverse 
medical incidents with the assurance of confidentiality and privilege 
protections. Joining a PSO may alleviate providers’ fear of participation in 
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the peer review process.  
Through the PSQIA, Florida healthcare providers will not only 
improve the quality of healthcare by protecting peer review, but also by 
analyzing and aggregating PSO-submitted information. PSOs foster an 
environment in which providers can learn from their mistakes and the 
mistakes of others. Through the sharing of patient safety event information 
within PSOs and the NSPD, Florida healthcare providers will be able to 
counteract Amendment 7 and guarantee the exchange of medical 
information and data. Therefore, while the interplay between Florida’s 
Amendment 7 and Congress’s PSQIA has yet to be determined, the impact 
of the PSQIA is that adverse medical incidents will likely be reduced 
overall, despite the interference of Amendment 7 with full and frank peer 
review in Florida. 
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CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 546 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine’s To Err Is Human report (IOM 
Report) found that between 44,000 and 98,000 patients die annually in 
American hospitals due to medical errors, an estimate that caused medical 
error to exceed the then-eighth leading cause of death—suicide.1 The 
startling findings of the prevalence of medical errors thrust the national 
healthcare system into the spotlight,2 with the staggering estimates also 
exceeding the number of deaths caused by vehicle accidents and breast 
cancer.3 Yet the IOM Report asserted that these estimates were perhaps 
just the “tip of the iceberg.”4 It additionally stated that adverse medical 
incidents result in at least $17 billion in total national costs.5 Implementing 
the IOM Report’s recommendations,6 the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act (PSQIA) was enacted on July 29, 2005,7 to assist and 
encourage healthcare providers to develop and participate in voluntary 
                                                                                                                     
 1. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn 
et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN] (citing Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data 
for 1997, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., June 30, 1999, at 1, 27, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr47/nvs47_19.pdf). The report defines “medical error” as the incorrect 
administration of care or the occurrence of an unplanned result. Id. at 4. Injury caused by healthcare 
providers—known as iatrogenesis—is considered the opposite of quality care. BARRY R. FURROW 
ET AL., LIABILITY AND QUALITY ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 41 (6th ed. 2008). 
 2. See TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 4.  
 3. Id. at 26 (citing Joyce A. Martin et al., Births and Deaths: Preliminary Data for 1998, 
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., Oct. 5, 1999, at 1, 6, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr 
47/nvs47_25.pdf). While the current mortality by medical error rates vary, reports indicate that they 
have increased since 1999. See infra notes 259–64 and accompanying text. For instance, one report 
found that medical error deaths in 2007 were the fifth leading cause of death in the U.S., reaching 
98,000 deaths annually. Press Release, Millennium Research Group, Medical Error Is the Fifth-
Leading Cause of Death in the U.S. (Sept. 22, 2006) (citing MILLENNIUM RESEARCH GRP., US 
MARKETS FOR ACUTE CARE CLINICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2006 (2006), available at 
http://mrg.net/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/MEDICAL-ERROR-IS-THE-FIFTH-LEADING-
CAUSE-OF-DEATH.aspx). Meanwhile, for comparison, the mortality rates for vehicle accidents 
and breast cancer have remained relatively stable. Jiaquan Xu et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2007, 
NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., May 20, 2010, at 1, 32–35 tbl.10, available at http://www.cdc 
.gov/NCHS/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58_19.pdf.  
 4. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 5. Id. at 1–2 (citing Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 
36 INQUIRY 255, 260 (1999)). These total national costs include “lost income, lost household 
production, disability and health care costs.” Id. at 1 (citing Thomas et al., supra, at 355–64).  
 6. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM–SUMMARY 3–4 
(1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY], http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20 
Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf.  
 7. Pub. L. No. 109-41 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26); see also Charles M. 
Key, The Role of PSQIA Privilege in Medical Error Reduction, HEALTH L., Oct. 2008, at 24. 
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reporting systems concerning patient safety events.8 The IOM Report 
stated that preventable medical errors from healthcare providers’ 
systematic flaws could be determined, analyzed, and addressed through the 
creation of a network of shared patient safety data and information.9 Thus, 
the PSQIA enables healthcare providers to share their records and reports 
of medical errors and “near misses” to other providers by joining a patient 
safety organization (PSO).10 The PSQIA ensures that information shared 
within PSOs is privileged and confidential11 to encourage providers’ 
participation without the fear of liability.12 The PSQIA took effect on 
January 19, 2009.13 Now there are approximately eighty listed PSOs across 
the nation14 sharing information to address the prevalence of medical errors 
and to improve the quality of healthcare.  
More than ten years after the publication of the IOM Report, the 
healthcare system was again brought into the national spotlight in 2010, 
when Congress passed new healthcare reform measures.15 Even after that 
reform, healthcare continues to be hotly debated nationally.16 One of the 
concerns about the reform has been its potential to decrease the quality of 
healthcare nationwide.17 However, unbeknownst to many Floridians, the 
2004 enactment of Florida’s Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse 
Medical Incidents,18 commonly referred to as Amendment 7,19 has already 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732, 70,732 (Nov. 21, 
2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009)).  
 9. TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 3.  
 10. See infra Section IV.B.  
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22 (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204, 3.206 (2010).  
 12. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (describing physicians’ fear of liability as the 
primary reason for not engaging in the open discussion of patient safety events).  
 13. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. at 70,732.  
 14. Geographic Directory of Listed Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE 
RES. & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/geolist.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter Geographic Directory].  
 15. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); 
see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 124 Stat. 
1029 (2010). 
 16. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Federal Judge Tosses out Sweeping Health Care Reform Act, CNN 
POLITICS (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/01/31/health.care.unconstitutional 
/index.html?iref=allsearch; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Sheyn, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in 
White Collar Crime Statutes: How the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 Sheds 
Light on the “General Intent Revolution,” 64 FLA. L. REV. 449 (2012). 
 17. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly & Jon Cohen, Most Want Health Reform but Fear Its Side 
Effects, WASH. POST, June 24, 2009, at A01 (discussing fears of lower quality, fewer choices, and 
higher costs).  
 18. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25.  
 19. See Richard Johns, Amendment 7: The Patients’ Right to Know Flexes Its Muscle in 
Florida, LAW WATCH (Foley & Lardner LLP, Orlando, Fla.), May 25, 2006, at 1, available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/3390/Law%20Watch%20May%2 
025,%202006.pdf. 
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created the potential for a decrease in the quality of healthcare statewide 
due to its negative impact on Florida’s peer review system.20  
Amendment 7 provides Florida patients access to any records or reports 
of past adverse medical incidents involving doctors, hospitals, and 
healthcare providers.21 It was one of three medical malpractice 
amendments featured on the November 2004 statewide ballot.22 Through 
the citizen initiative process authorized by the Florida Constitution,23 all 
three of the proposed amendments passed and were incorporated into the 
Florida Constitution.24 Although Amendment 7 appeared to enjoy strong 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know 
Come at Too High a Price?, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2005, at 7, 8–10 (describing Amendment 7’s 
detrimental effect on the quality of healthcare because of the eradication and undermining of 
existing peer review and self-critical analysis protections); see also Eric S. Matthew, Note, A New 
Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the “Medical Malpractice” Amendments Reveals 
Potential Cures for Florida’s Ailing Citizen Initiative Process, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 331, 351 
(2006) (stating that Amendment 7 may decrease the quality of healthcare due to its repeal of 
statutory privileges designed to protect the analysis of the quality of treatment and physicians).  
 21. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a).  
 22. November 2, 2004 General Election, Official Results, Constitutional Amendment, DIV. 
ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE, http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/SummaryRpt.asp 
?ElectionDate=11/2/2004&Race=AMD (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter 2004 Election 
Results].  
 23. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The Florida citizen initiative process enables voters to adopt 
constitutional amendments through a general election. See Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting 
a New Standard for Public Education: Revision 6 Increases the Duty of the State to Make 
“Adequate Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. REV. 329, 359 n.146 (2000); see also 
Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7. A sponsor submits an initiative’s ballot title and proposed 
amendment text to the Division of Elections of the Department of State. After receiving approval 
from the Department of State, the sponsor must then gather the required number of signatures. 
Before the initiative is placed on the ballot, the Florida Supreme Court reviews the proposed 
initiative via a petition for an advisory opinion from the Attorney General. Id. at 7–8; see also Mary 
Coombs, How Not to Do Medical Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 
373, 378 (2008). The Florida Supreme Court’s advisory opinion determines if the initiative meets 
the single subject requirement and if the ballot title and text are unambiguous. Coombs, supra, at 
378. The initiative will then appear on the ballot if the Florida Supreme Court does not reject the 
proposed initiative and if the sponsor receives the required number of signatures at least ninety-one 
days before the general election. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7.  
 24. Amendment 3 and Amendment 8 were the other two medical malpractice amendments. 
See Coombs, supra note 23, at 376. Known as the Medical Liability Claimant’s Compensation 
Amendment, Amendment 3 limits attorney contingency fees in malpractice suits. Amendment 3 is 
now article I, section 26 of the Florida Constitution. The Medical Liability Claimant’s 
Compensation Amendment, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T. STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/ 
initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=37767&seqnum=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Amendment 8, 
commonly referred to as “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” requires the revocation of a physician’s 
license after the physician has committed medical malpractice three or more times. Coombs, supra 
note 23, at 376, 392 (quoting Editorial, Keep Malpractice Fight out of State Constitution, PALM 
BEACH POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at 18A (internal quotation marks omitted)). Amendment 8 is now article 
X, section 20 of the Florida Constitution. Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice, 
DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account= 
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electoral support,25 a “firestorm of litigation” concerning Amendment 7’s 
application and constitutionality quickly commenced following its 
passage.26 Since that time, Amendment 7 has been anything but “a simple 
amendment directed to overruling an exemption.”27  
This Note addresses the impact of Amendment 7 on the peer review 
process and the quality of healthcare in Florida. By promoting the quality 
of healthcare through the sharing of patient safety information, the PSQIA 
can counteract Amendment 7’s detrimental effect on the peer review 
process. Part I summarizes the peer review process. Part II discusses peer 
review protections in Florida before Amendment 7. The enactment of 
Amendment 7 and the responses by the Florida legislature and Florida 
courts then follow. Part II concludes with a description of the current 
landscape under Amendment 7. Part III outlines the enactment and purpose 
behind the PSQIA, explains the creation of PSOs and the Network of 
Patient Safety Databases (NPSD), and describes the confidentiality and 
privilege protections under patient safety work product (PSWP) and patient 
safety evaluation systems (PSES). Part III concludes with a discussion of 
the judicial response to the PSQIA and the future of the PSQIA. Part IV 
discusses the PSQIA as a potential solution to ensure the quality of 
healthcare by counteracting Amendment 7’s detrimental effect on the 
sharing and analysis of patient safety events through the peer review 
process. Part IV also explains the process of becoming a PSO and the 
advantages and disadvantages of joining a PSO. Finally, this Note 
concludes that while it is still too early to determine Amendment 7’s 
impact on the peer review system and consequently on the quality of 
healthcare systems statewide, any possible solution to counteract 
Amendment 7 is beneficial to the consumer patient.  
Under Amendment 7, healthcare providers are less likely to engage in 
critical analysis of their fellow physicians during peer review because of a 
lack of confidentiality and privilege protections. It follows, then, that peer 
review will no longer yield the kind of discourse that is necessary for its 
                                                                                                                     
35169&seqnum=8 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 25. A total of 81.2% of Floridians (5,849,125) voted for Amendment 7 in comparison to the 
18.8% of Floridians (1,358,183) who voted against it. 2004 Election Results, supra note 22. 
 26. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: 
Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity of Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of 
Florida, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2009, at 20, 20–21 (“[F]rom the point of ignition until now, Amendment 7 
has taken off like a rocket, leaving in its trail a plume of litigation and court rulings that have had a 
dramatic impact on the way medical malpractice attorneys engage in discovery, and the way 
doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers conduct peer review, credentialing, 
investigations, quality assurance, and risk assessments.”).  
 27. Mark D. Killian, Academy, FMA Square Off over Amendments, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 
2004 (quoting former Florida Supreme Court Justice Harry Lee Anstead) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/cb53c80c8fabd49d85256b5900 
678f6c/d2df312684ca6d7985256ebb0054607f. 
6
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full effectiveness. As a result, Florida patients will likely suffer a decrease 
in the quality of healthcare. Additionally, Amendment 7’s broad scope will 
probably increase the number of medical malpractice claims, thus 
increasing medical malpractice insurance premiums. As these premiums 
increase, Florida consumer patients will be forced to pay higher medical 
costs. Therefore, Florida patients’ quality and cost of healthcare are 
potentially at stake.  
I.  THE PEER REVIEW PROCESS 
The first peer review committees were created in 1918 by the American 
College of Surgeons to assess the quality of care at local hospitals; these 
committees began the national recognition of medical errors.28 Over the 
past century, the peer review process has become key in assuring the 
quality of medical care and “has become an institutionalized practice.”29 
The process begins at the credentialing stage, when peer review 
committees (composed of physicians with specialized medical knowledge) 
review a medical staff applicant’s education, experience, qualifications, 
and training.30 Peer review continues for existing medical staff by 
analyzing “quality assurance data, diagnostic and laboratory utilization 
reports, and other information regarding each staff member’s actual 
practice at the hospital.”31 Generally, each member of a hospital’s medical 
staff is required to undergo peer review every two years regardless of 
whether a quality concern has occurred; however, a physician’s clinical 
privileges are reviewable whenever quality concerns warrant more 
immediate action.32  
Peer review creates a system of “self-policing and self-regulating”33 
among doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers. The information 
gathered from peer review reports enables medical professionals to take 
corrective actions and measures, such as increasing training programs, 
creating standardized procedures, and revoking physician privileges when 
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Kathryn Leaman, Note, Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA 
May Provide Federal Privilege and Confidentiality Protections to the Medical Peer Review 
Process, 11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 177, 178 (2007).  
 29. Talia Storch, Note, Medical Peer Review in Florida: Is the Privilege Under Attack?, 32 
NOVA L. REV. 269, 269–70 (2007) (citing Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, 
Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & 
HEALTH 169, 169 (1992–93)).  
 30. See Lisa M. Nijm, Note, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and 
Federal Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003).  
 31. Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost but No Benefit—Is It Time 
for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 14 (1999).  
 32. See id. 
 33. Laura V. Yaeger, Note, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has 
Florida’s Peer Review Privilege Vanished?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 123, 124 (2009). 
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necessary.34 The process creates a higher standard of quality of care by 
weeding out “incompetence in the medical profession.”35  
Peer review supporters assert that three main premises underlie the 
strength of the peer review process.36 First, physicians are best situated, 
due to their specialized training, to evaluate and observe other physicians’ 
practice methods and potential risks.37 Second, the candid evaluation and 
criticism of fellow medical providers is the best way to determine subpar 
and superlative care.38 Third, peer review motivates participants to 
maintain a high standard of care within their medical practice.39 Hence, the 
peer review process promotes learning from providers’ past medical errors 
and “near misses,” rather than assigning blame to individuals.40 This strong 
belief in the peer review process is evidenced by the fact that hospitals 
must have a peer evaluation system in place in order to receive 
accreditation by the Joint Commission (formerly known as the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations).41 The peer 
review process is thus “one of medicine’s most effective risk management 
and quality improvement tools.”42 
 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Johns, supra note 19, at 1.  
 35. Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and 
Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 692 (2003) (citing Nilavar v. 
Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 600 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).  
 36. See Ilene N. Moore et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical 
Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (2006).  
 37. See id. (“Peer review offers an incentive for similarly trained physicians working in the 
same environment to identify colleagues with knowledge gaps or deficiencies in technical skills, 
facilitate their remediation, and monitor their progress and performance, in preference to external 
parties assuming this responsibility.”).  
 38. See id. at 1177; see also Eric Scott Bell, Comment, Make Way: Why Arkansas and the 
States Should Narrow Health Care Peer Review Privileges for the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005, 62 ARK. L. REV. 745, 749–54 (2009).  
 39. See Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1177; see also Bell, supra note 38, at 752–53.  
 40. See Patricia A. Sullivan & Jon M. Anderson, The Health Care Debate: If Lack of Tort 
Reform Is Part of the Problem, Federalized Protection for Peer Review Needs to Be Part of the 
Solution, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 41, 47 (2010). It is argued that this blame game persistent 
in medical malpractice litigation and the tort system has become a reason for providers to conceal 
medical mistakes and “near misses.” Id. at 44 (quoting Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, 
Communicating About Care: Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to 
Promote Patient Safety, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 219, 220–21, 223 (2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 41. See Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 29, at 172–73; see also Christopher S. Morter, Note, 
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will Physicians Find Peer Review More 
Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1116–18 (1988). Although the Joint Commission is a 
nongovernmental, voluntary private accreditation association, it is very influential because both 
state and federal governments rely on Joint Commission accreditation for hospital licensure as well 
as Medicare and Medicaid hospital programs. FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 149.  
 42. Nijm, supra note 30, at 541.  
8
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II.  AMENDMENT 7: PATIENTS’ RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT ADVERSE 
MEDICAL INCIDENTS  
A.  Florida’s Peer Review Protections Before Amendment 7 
Before the passage of Amendment 7, the Florida Legislature and the 
state’s courts long recognized the importance of affording confidentiality 
and privilege protections43 to peer review reports in order to maintain the 
quality of healthcare for patients throughout the state.44 Florida statutes 
additionally privileged other medical review systems such as credentialing, 
medical review committees, and risk management.45 Florida enacted a peer 
review statute before the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 
(HCQIA)46 introduced national standards for peer review.47 Under 
Florida’s statutory protections,48 medical peer review records were 
confidential, privileged, and excluded from discovery.49 The protection of 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Confidentiality and privilege are two separate legal concepts. Under confidentiality 
protections, parties must refrain from disclosing information discussed in the peer review process 
outside a judicial proceeding. See id. at 548; see also Storch, supra note 29, at 276–77. Privilege 
protections safeguard particular information from disclosure during discovery or at trial. Nijm, 
supra note 30, at 546. Privileged information will often also be considered confidential information. 
See id. at 548.  
 44. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 8–9.   
 45. Matthew, supra note 20, at 351 n.108. For examples of these statutory protections, see 
infra note 48.  
 46. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–52 (2006)). The HCQIA “granted immunity to peer review 
committee members” and required healthcare providers “to report physician misconduct to the 
National Practitioner’s Data Bank.” Bell, supra note 38, at 751–52. In addition to the HCQIA’s 
purpose to improve the quality of healthcare, the HCQIA was also created “to restrict the ability of 
incompetent physicians to move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the 
physician’s previous damaging or incompetent performance.” 42 U.S.C. § 11101(2). Generally, 
courts do not find that the HCQIA enacts a broad privilege protecting the non-discoverability of 
peer review reports. See KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–96 (D. 
Del. 2010).  
 47. Christina M. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State 
and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 125 (2000) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 766.101(5) (West 1997)). 
 48. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0191 (2010) (requiring hospitals to create credentialing rules 
and granting discovery protection for credentialing records); id. § 395.0193 (requiring mandatory 
peer review for hospitals and protecting any peer review records from disclosure); id. § 395.0197 
(requiring hospitals to create “an internal risk management program” that includes the production of 
confidential, non-discoverable reports of adverse incidents); id. § 400.118 (requiring nursing homes 
to conduct quality-of-care monitoring reports); id. § 459.016 (providing confidentiality and non-
discoverability protections to disciplinary reports by medical organizations); id. § 766.101(5) 
(protecting a medical review committee’s investigations, proceedings, and records from discovery 
and evidence); id. § 766.1016(2) (protecting patient safety data).  
 49. See Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7: Challenges and Solutions to a National 
Trend, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 1–3 (May 5, 2008), http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication 
=5012 [hereinafter Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7]. 
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peer review reports was “based on a conventional belief that the medical 
profession could not deliver first-class healthcare without a high level of 
self-oversight, coupled with near bulletproof immunity from discovery of 
behind-the-scenes activities related to these pursuits.”50 These protections 
encouraged physicians “to be candid and vigorous in the performance 
evaluations of their peers, without fear that those evaluations would be 
used for improper purposes,” such as medical malpractice suits.51 Thus, the 
“rationale for cloaking peer review . . . in confidentiality” follows from the 
need to promote full candor among peer review participants in order to 
improve, or at least maintain, the quality of healthcare.52  
As states began to enact peer review privilege statutes in the 1970s and 
1980s,53 Florida courts led the way with an expansive approach to peer 
review protections.54 Florida courts saw confidentiality protections as 
integral to improving the quality of healthcare for patients statewide.55 
Thus, courts “firmly guarded”56 the state’s various peer review protection 
statutes. In Holly v. Auld,57 the Florida Supreme Court provided an 
economic justification for the peer review privilege, stating, “In an effort to 
control the escalating cost of healthcare in the state, the legislature deemed 
it wise to encourage a degree of self-regulation by the medical profession 
through peer review and evaluation.”58 The Holly court additionally 
emphasized the need for confidentiality in peer review in order to provide 
for “full, frank medical peer evaluation.”59 
Eight years later, in Cruger v. Love,60 the Florida Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its expansive view of peer review protection in order to 
                                                                                                                     
 50. Harris, supra note 26, at 20.  
 51. Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.  
 52. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 9.  
 53. See Bell, supra note 38, at 751.  
 54. See Graham, supra note 47, at 125.  
 55. See Dade Cnty. Med. Ass’n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) 
(“Confidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and these meetings are 
essential to the continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Candid and 
conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine quo non of adequate hospital care. To subject 
these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional 
necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations.” (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 
50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), aff’d mem., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 56. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 126.  
 57. 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984). In Holly, a plaintiff physician filed a defamation claim against 
another physician for the physician’s statements to the credentialing committee regarding the 
plaintiff’s staff privileges. The plaintiff sought discovery of these credentialing records. Id. at 218. 
 58. Id. at 219–20.  
 59. Id. at 220.  
 60. 599 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 1992). In Cruger, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant 
physician for alleged negligent treatment of the plaintiff’s son’s fractured thumb. The plaintiff 
sought discovery of three local hospitals’ records regarding the defendant’s application for staff 
privileges. Id. at 112. 
10
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“prohibit the chilling effect of the potential public disclosure of statements 
made to or information prepared for and used by the committee in carrying 
out its peer review function.”61 The court explained that this “chilling 
effect”62 causes doctors, absent peer review protection, “to be reluctant to 
engage in strict peer review due to a number of apprehensions: loss of 
referrals, respect, and friends; possible retaliations; vulnerability to torts; 
and fear of malpractice actions in which the records of the peer review 
proceedings might be used.”63 The court held that a privilege protection 
statute applied to any documents that were reviewed by a hospital board or 
committee during its peer-review process, including a physician’s 
application for staff privileges.64 The court reasoned that full disclosure of 
a physician’s information in an application is pertinent to the determination 
of staff privileges; without this statutory protection, a physician would be 
reluctant to engage in full, detailed reporting because of his fear that the 
reported information may be used against him in the future.65 Thus, under 
the Cruger court’s broad interpretation, “essentially all [peer review] 
documents are privileged.”66  
B.  The Enactment of Amendment 7 
As the Florida Legislature and the state’s courts continued to protect 
the peer review process, the war between doctors and plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
which had waged since the 1990s, culminated at the November 2, 2004 
general election.67 Amendment 7 made it onto the ballot due to the efforts 
of a movement by plaintiffs’ attorneys to “open up to public scrutiny a 
medical community cloistered behind a veil of secrecy.”68 The state 
statutory protections, advocates of Amendment 7 argued, “crowned the 
medical profession with an almost unlimited degree of authority, not only 
to regulate itself, but to conduct clandestine deliberations involving peer 
review.”69 Sponsored by Floridians for Patient Protection70 and supported 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 115.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. (quoting Gregory S. Gosfield, Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the 
Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 558 (1979)).  
 64. Id. at 114.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 126.  
 67. See Harris, supra note 26, at 20; see also Greg Groeller, Doctor-Lawyer Tussle Plays out 
Before Voters, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 27, 2004, at B1; Bob LaMendola, Doctors, Lawyers Lock 
Horns over 3 Ballot Questions, SUN-SENT. (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 20, 2004, at 1A.  
 68. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 12 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. Harris, supra note 26, at 20. Amendment 7 proponents argued that the self-policing nature 
of peer review created “an aura of controversy . . . surround[ing] the idea of allowing health care 
personnel to police themselves in order to ensure high quality patient care.” Morter, supra note 41, 
at 1115.  
 70. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T 
STATE, http://election.dos.state.fl.us/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account=35169&seqnum=3 (last 
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by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers,71 Amendment 7 was titled the 
“Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents.”72 The ballot 
summary read:  
Current Florida law restricts information available to patients 
related to investigations of adverse medical incidents, such as 
medical malpractice. This amendment would give patients the 
right to review, upon request, records of health care facilities’ 
or providers’ adverse medical incidents, including those 
which could cause injury or death. Provides that patients’ 
identities should not be disclosed.73  
Proponents advocated Amendment 7 as a consumer information and 
protection measure,74 claiming that it would provide Florida patients with 
information about doctors, hospitals, and healthcare providers statewide; 
patients would no longer have to base their decision primarily on the word 
of mouth of the type of care rendered by these providers.75  
However, in light of the underlying war between doctors and attorneys, 
Amendment 7 was often referred to by its opponents as a “tit for tat”76 
amendment, created in response to Amendment 3’s proposal77 “to limit 
plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.”78 This accusation is based on the fact that 
Amendment 7 enables plaintiffs’ attorneys to access peer review’s candid 
criticism of the delivery of care in order to achieve higher settlements and 
verdicts.79  
                                                                                                                     
visited Jan. 29, 2012).  
 71. See Killian, supra note 27. 
 72. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, supra note 70.  
 73. Id. 
 74. See Harris, supra note 26, at 21; see also Killian, supra note 27; Robert C. Weill, Buster 
and the Continuing Saga over the Patients’ Right-to-Know-About-Medical-Incidents-Amendment, 
TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Winter 2009, at 14, 14.  
 75. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7 n.5 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 76. Killian, supra note 27 (quoting Florida Supreme Court Justice Barbara Pariente) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 77. Pursuant to Amendment 3, the claimant in a medical liability case with a contingency fee 
will receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000 and 90% of all damages in excess of that 
amount, exclusive of customary and reasonable costs and regardless of the number of defendants. 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 26.  
 78. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also Matthew, supra note 20, at 350–51 (“Many 
defense lawyers and health care professionals actually believe the amendment was proposed in 
direct response to Amendment 3. Metaphorically speaking, the electorate inadvertently supported 
Amendment 7 which treats the disease (tort reform hindering plaintiff attorneys) instead of the 
patient (health care as a whole).” (footnote omitted)); Michael A. Wasylik, Keep Our Best Doctors, 
TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 27, 2004, at 11 (“Amendments 7 and 8 are intimidation tactics by the trial 
lawyers in response to Amendment 3.”).  
 79. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 42.  
12
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During oral arguments and review of the proposed amendment in June 
2004,80 the Florida Supreme Court questioned the proponents of 
Amendment 7 regarding voters’ understanding of the amendment—
namely, that they would not understand that the amendment would, in 
effect, allow for all medical records to be public.81 In response, counsel for 
Floridians for Patient Protection stated, “‘[T]he average voters of 
reasonable intelligence’ will understand the chief purpose of the 
amendment is to make medical records available.”82 Amendment 7 seemed 
to provide a helpful method of gaining access to information critical for 
potential lawsuits.83 Amendment 7’s proponents downplayed the proposed 
amendment’s effect on the peer review privilege.84 The Florida Dental 
Association, which opposed the amendment, expressed concern that the 
ballot summary failed to inform voters of the effect and impact on 
Florida’s peer review system.85 However, in its Advisory Opinion 
regarding Amendment 7, the Florida Supreme Court stated that even if 
Amendment 7 could impact the peer review process, “[i]t cannot be said 
that the lack of a prediction as to the amendment’s effect on the peer 
review statutes misleads the public as to the chief purpose of the 
amendment.”86 After receiving the requisite number of signatures87 and 
gaining the approval of the Florida Supreme Court,88 Amendment 7 was 
added to the November 2, 2004 ballot.  
Doctors throughout the state lobbied against Amendment 7; they 
argued that peer review protection is necessary to maintain a high quality 
of healthcare for Florida patients.89 Major newspapers throughout Florida 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See Killian, supra note 27.  
 81. Justice Charles T. Wells raised this concern during the argument. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting attorney Timothy McLendon). 
 83. See Matthew, supra note 20, at 351.  
 84. See id.  
 85. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 
880 So. 2d 617, 622 (Fla. 2004).  
 86. Id.  
 87. In order to be placed on the ballot, Amendment 7 was required to have 488,722 
signatures. Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, supra note 70. Amendment 7 
proponents received an estimated 519,838 signatures. Id.  
 88. Advisory Op. to Att’y Gen. re Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 
supra note 85, at 618. 
 89. See Dennis S. Agliano, Protect Your Health Care, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 10, 2004, at 1 
(“Amendment 7, the so-called Patient’s Right to Know amendment, will destroy key measures in 
place to help Florida’s patients. Adverse incident reports have always been under the confidentiality 
of the peer review committee, which is extremely important for quality assurance and patient safety. 
Vote no on 7.”); LaMendola, supra note 67 (“But doctors and hospitals argue that the complaints 
often prove groundless, and if aired, could unfairly tarnish reputations. They say going public 
would kill the well-established process of ‘peer review,’ in which physician panels study deaths and 
injuries in secret to learn how to prevent errors.”); Joseph D. Portoghese, The Hidden Agenda of 
Amendment 7, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 19, 2004, at A13 (“[T]he real intent of this amendment 
is to open a hospital’s internal reviews of patient safety and quality-assurance efforts to 
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also opposed Amendment 7.90 Despite this resistance, Amendment 7 
passed with an overwhelming 81.2% of the vote on November 2, 2004.91 
The Florida Constitution was subsequently amended to include 
Amendment 7 in article X, section 25, which provides Florida patients with 
“a right to have access to any records made or received in the course of 
business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse 
medical incident.”92 However, Amendment 7 conforms to the privacy 
requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA)93 by protecting patients’ identities from disclosure and 
mandating adherence to all federal privacy restrictions.94  
C.  The Legislative and Judicial Responses to Amendment 7 
The enactment of Amendment 7 “sparked a flurry of litigation in the 
courts across Florida.”95 Within days of the November 2, 2004 election, 
Floridians filed lawsuits and courts ordered injunctions in response to 
Amendment 7.96 Opponents of Amendment 7 also “sought protection from 
the Florida [L]egislature.”97 In June 2005, the Florida Legislature 
implemented section 381.028.98 This statute attempted to limit Amendment 
7’s broad scope in a number of ways.99 First, section 381.028 stated that 
Amendment 7 was not retroactive; thus it applied only to adverse incident 
reports created on or after November 2, 2004.100 Second, Amendment 7 
                                                                                                                     
trial attorneys for the purpose of lawsuits.”); Wasylik, supra note 78 (“The truth is, only the worst 
doctors in our state will be in favor of Amendment 7, as it will reduce the internal hospital reviews 
of medical errors that enable us to discipline unskilled physicians. . [sic] Peer review is the only 
way for hospitals to immediately protect citizens from the unprofessional actions of bad doctors.”).  
 90. See Editorial, Limit Changes—Our Position: Only 2 of 8 Constitutional Amendments 
Deserve Voter Support, ORLANDO SENT., Oct. 17, 2004, at G2; see also Editorial, The Tribune’s 
Picks, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 18, 2004, at 15; Editorial, Vote No on 3 Medical Issues, SUN-SENT. (Fort 
Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 24, 2004, at 4J.  
 91. See supra Introduction and notes 20–26 and accompanying text (discussing the 
November 2, 2004 General Election results).  
 92. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a).  
 93. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).  
 94. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(b).  
 95. Johns, supra note 19, at 1.  
 96. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 394; see also Guy Boulton, Hospitals Tried to Pre-Empt 
Malpractice Amendments, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 6, 2004, at MONEYSENSE 1; Greg Groeller, 
Medical Initiatives Already Face Suits: The Malpractice Amendments Likely Will Take a While to 
Implement, Experts Say, ORLANDO SENT., Nov. 4, 2004, at A16.  
 97. Coombs, supra note 23, at 396.  
 98. The Florida Legislature first enacted this law as chapter 2005-265, Laws of Florida, 
effective June 20, 2005. The law was codified as section 381.028 of the Florida Statutes in 2007. 
See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2008). 
 99. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 396; see also Weill, supra note 74, at 14; Florida Peer 
Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.  
 100. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(5).  
14
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applied only to final reports and provided confidentiality and non-
discoverability protection to preliminary reports and other materials used 
by review committees.101 Third, requesting patients were entitled only to 
records that involved an incident concerning the same condition, diagnosis, 
or treatment as their own.102 Fourth, any information received by a patient 
was still subject to existing Florida statutes that protected against 
admissibility and discovery.103  
The enactment of Amendment 7 and section 381.028 resulted in a 
conflict between two Florida District Courts of Appeal.104 In Florida 
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster,105 the Florida Supreme Court addressed 
this conflict and other issues surrounding Amendment 7.106 The court’s 
ruling firmly solidified Amendment 7’s constitutional scope.107 First, the 
court held that Amendment 7 is self-executing.108 Second, Amendment 7 
applies retroactively to adverse medical incident reports in existence prior 
to November 2, 2004.109 Third, several subsections of section 381.028 
unconstitutionally impinged upon Amendment 7 and the court effectively 
severed them from the statute.110 Regarding these conflicting subsections, 
the Florida Supreme Court stated that section 381.028 could not limit 
Amendment 7’s application to final reports because the amendment 
applied to any records that relate to an adverse medical incident. 
Additionally, the court stated that the statute could not limit patients’ 
records requests to records that involved an incident with the same 
condition, diagnosis, or treatment as their own.111  
 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Id. § 381.028(3)(j); see also Coombs, supra note 23, at 396.  
 102. FLA. STAT. § 381.028(7)(a).  
 103. Id. § 381.028(6); see also Coombs, supra note 23, at 396–97. 
 104. In Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, the appellees sought production of 
documents regarding the investigation of an adverse medical incident. 932 So. 2d 344, 348 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2006). In Notami Hospital of Florida, Inc. v. Bowen, the appellees sought production 
of documents regarding the selection, retention, or termination of a doctor. 927 So. 2d 139, 142 
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2006). In both cases, the appellant hospitals argued that the information was 
confidential and protected under various statutes in existence before Amendment 7. See Buster, 984 
So. 2d 478, 482 (Fla. 2008). Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal held that Amendment 7 is self-
executing and allows for discovery, but does not apply retroactively. Buster, 932 So. 2d at 356. The 
First District also found  that Amendment 7 is self-executing; in addition, that court held that 
section 381.028 is unconstitutional. However, the First District held that Amendment 7 does apply 
retroactively to existing records, creating the circuit conflict. Bowen, 927 So. 2d at 145. 
 105. 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008).  
 106. Id. at 480–81.  
 107. See Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.  
 108. Buster, 984 So. 2d at 494.  
 109. Id. Section 381.028’s time limitation for records generated only after November 2, 2004 
was severed as unconstitutional. Id. at 492–94.  
 110. Id. The Florida Supreme Court explained that any substantial limitation imposed by the 
legislature on a right in an amendment is unconstitutional. Id. at 492.  
 111. Id. 
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Demonstrating judicial deference to the citizen initiative process, the 
Florida Supreme Court cited the lower court’s opinion to explain its 
decision to uphold Amendment 7:  
We believe that Amendment 7 heralds a change in the 
public policy of this state to lift the shroud of privilege and 
confidentiality in order to foster disclosure of information that 
will allow patients to better determine from whom they 
should seek health care, evaluate the quality and fitness of 
health care providers currently rendering service to them, and 
allow them access to information gathered through the self-
policing processes during the discovery period of litigation 
filed by injured patients or the estates of deceased patients 
against their health care providers.112  
In addition to supporting the voters, the court further explained that 
healthcare providers had never been granted a vested substantive right for 
peer review protection; they had simply expected that the Florida 
Legislature would continue to protect the access and use of peer review 
documents.113 The Florida Supreme Court’s 4–3 decision114 represented a 
clear victory for Amendment 7. This ruling affected multiple Florida 
statutes115 that had previously provided protection to peer review reports; 
the Florida Supreme Court decisively concluded that Amendment 7 
preempts all statutory peer review privileges in Florida.116 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 112. Id. at 494 (quoting Buster, 932 So. 2d 344, 348, 355–56 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court continued to quote the Fifth District’s opinion to 
explain:  
We have come to this conclusion because we are obliged to interpret and apply 
Amendment 7 in accord with the intention of the people of this state who enacted 
it, and we have done so. It is not for us to judge the wisdom of the constitutional 
amendments enacted or the change in public policy pronounced through those 
amendments, even in instances where the change involves abrogation of long-
standing legislation that establishes and promotes an equally or arguably more 
compelling public policy.  
Id. (quoting Buster, 932 So. 2d at 356) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 113. Id. at 491.  
 114. Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1.  
 115. The affected statutes included Florida Statutes sections 395.0191(8), 395.0193(7), 
395.0193(8), 395.0197(6)(c), 395.0197(7), 395.0197(9), 395.0197(11), 766.101(5), and 
766.1016(2). Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 1. 
 116. Buster, 984 So. 2d at 488–94; see also The Amendment 7 Challenge: Is a PSO Hype or 
Hope?, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, 6 (Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s88EventMat 
erials/FileUpload587/1670/TheAmendment7.pdf [hereinafter The Amendment 7 Challenge] 
(compiling materials from the firm’s program on the topic). 
16
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Since the Buster decision, Amendment 7 continues to be a 
controversial issue in Florida.117 Throughout the state, Florida courts have 
varied in the application of Amendment 7.118 For instance, in October 
2008, the Third District Court of Appeal restricted the reach of 
Amendment 7 in Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Garcia,119 while the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal expanded Amendment 7’s scope in 
Amisub North Ridge Hospital, Inc. v. Sonaglia.120 In Garcia, the Third 
District restricted the full disclosure of a physician’s complete 
credentialing files because the disclosure and production of the files would 
reveal names and confidential information unrelated to adverse medical 
incidents under Amendment 7.121 In contrast, in Sonaglia, the Fourth 
District stated that Amendment 7 “does not require the information a 
patient seeks to be relevant to a pending medical malpractice action or to a 
medical care decision.”122  
In Baldwin v. Shands Teaching Hospital & Clinics, Inc.,123 the First 
District Court of Appeal further expanded the scope of Amendment 7.124 
The court explained that an “adverse medical incident” under Amendment 
7 means not only “medical negligence,” but also includes “intentional 
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility 
or health care provider that caused or could have caused injury to . . . a 
patient.”125 If Amendment 7 only applies to incidents of medical 
negligence, then to avoid falling under this rule, medical providers likely 
would not label incidents as medical negligence.126  
The controversy surrounding the scope and validity of Amendment 7 
has continued well after the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the broad 
scope of the amendment in Buster. Opponents of Amendment 7 have 
challenged the amendment based on federal preemption by statutes that 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See Weill, supra note 74, at 18 (describing unresolved issues surrounding Amendment 7 
after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Buster). 
 118. See Paula J. Parisi & Areti G. Tsitsakis, The Wake of Amendment 7: Moving Forward to 
Protect Privileged Information, LITIG. Q. (Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Fla.), June 1, 2009, at 11, 
http://www.csklegal.com/wp-content/uploads/JuneQuarterly.pdf. 
 119. 994 So. 2d 390, 393 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  
 120. 995 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).  
 121. 994 So. 2d at 393. The court reasoned that these files were statutorily privileged and 
exempt from discovery under sections 395.0191(8) and 766.101(5), Florida Statutes. Id.  
 122. 995 So. 2d at 1001. The Fourth District thus permitted the production of peer review 
records in a physician’s action against a fellow physician for defamation and tortious interference 
with a business relationship. Id. at 1000–02.  
 123. 45 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 124. Id. at 120, 123–25.  
 125. Id. at 125 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(c)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 126. Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 381.028(7)(b), healthcare providers are responsible 
for the identification of records that are records of adverse medical incidents. See The Amendment 7 
Challenge, supra note 116, at 12–13.  
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require the confidentiality of certain records.127 However, Florida’s First 
and Fourth District Courts of Appeal both decided in 2009 that neither the 
HCQIA nor the federal Contracts Clause preempt Amendment 7.128 
Therefore, despite these challenges, Amendment 7 remains in effect. 
D.  The Current Landscape Under Amendment 7 
The recent rulings affirming Amendment 7’s broad scope will likely 
have a significant impact on the peer review process in Florida.129 The 
protective veil of confidentiality and privilege in Florida “has been ripped 
away.”130 Experts predict that the loss of confidentiality and privilege 
under Amendment 7 will negatively affect the quality of healthcare 
statewide131 because healthcare providers will be reluctant to participate in 
peer review.132 In 2002, 59% of physicians surveyed stated that fear of 
liability was the primary reason they did not engage in open discussion of 
patient injury cases.133 If physician participation in peer review does 
diminish as predicted, Amendment 7 “threatens to eradicate all existing 
protections for self-critical analysis.”134 Thus, Amendment 7 completely 
undermines the legislative intent and public policy reasons behind previous 
peer review statutes135 because without statutory protections, the peer 
review process will be ineffective.136 
In contrast, proponents of Amendment 7 can find support in similar 
arguments made by critics of peer review protections. The peer review 
process has been the subject of recent debate concerning whether it 
actually promotes healthcare quality and safety.137 Critics of peer review 
protection state that safety and quality issues often are not referred for peer 
                                                                                                                     
 127. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 11–12.  
 128. See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S. Broward v. Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 241–44 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009); W. Fla. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676, 684–88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 
2009).  
 129. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 401.  
 130. Yaeger, supra note 33, at 123.  
 131. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.  
 132. Id.  
 133. HARRIS INTERACTIVE INC., FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY: THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 32 
(2002), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Most-Doctors-
Report-Fear-of-Malpractice-Liability-2002-05.pdf [hereinafter FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY] 
(reporting the results of a survey conducted for Common Good). 
 134. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 8.  
 135. See Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992) (“While we recognized in Holly that 
the discovery privilege would impinge upon the rights of litigants to obtain information helpful or 
even essential to their cases, we assumed that the legislature balanced that against the benefits 
offered by effective self-policing by the medical community.” (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 
217, 220 (Fla. 1984))). 
 136. See Johns, supra note 19, at 1.  
 137. Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1182.  
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review.138 In addition, they argue that peer review protections conceal 
information that is often related to “contested issues in malpractice 
cases.”139 Critics also argue that the peer review privilege has a negative 
effect on disciplined physicians because a contesting physician is unable to 
use the privileged peer review materials upon which his disciplinary action 
is based in his defense.140 Some critics even allege that peer review 
protections foster pettiness between competing physicians and encourage 
them to make adverse peer review statements against each other.141 Others 
argue that the peer review process results in physicians spending less time 
with patients.142  
Although “promoted as a consumer protection measure,”143 
Amendment 7 predominantly has been used in medical malpractice 
lawsuits; it has rarely been used in the service of investigative journalism 
or as a check on doctors, hospitals, and health providers by the consumer 
patient.144 Thus, the use of Amendment 7 as a “litigation tool”145 will result 
in more medical malpractice lawsuits and greater healthcare costs.146 
Florida is already plagued by a “medical malpractice crisis,” as evidenced 
by the record number of recent verdicts against Florida hospitals.147 In 
2004, Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal noted that “[m]edical 
malpractice claims remain among the most intensively litigated in trial 
practice.”148 Due to this crisis, malpractice insurance premiums have 
drastically increased.149 As a result of these increasing insurance 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See id. at 1186.  
 139. See id. at 1183; see also Bassler, supra note 35, at 695.  
 140. See Moore et al., supra note 36, at 1184–85. 
 141. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 49–50; see also Bassler, supra note 35, at 
695.  
 142. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 50.  
 143. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 418; see also Killian, supra note 27. 
 144. Coombs, supra note 23, at 394–95. Healthcare providers’ performances and evaluations 
are available through other means. For instance, the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) has 
information on adverse actions taken by licensing boards, medical malpractice payments and 
settlements, and hospitals’ actions concerning clinical privileges. However, the general public 
cannot access the NPDB. In Florida, the Practitioner Profile has information on licensed 
practitioners (such as their education, staff privileges, and legal and disciplinary actions against 
them). Yet, because providers themselves report a majority of the information, negative information 
may be omitted. Id. at 418–19. 
 145. Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 7; see also Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 42 
(“The problem is that peer review and medical malpractice litigation are in tension with each other 
in that medical malpractice litigation feeds off candid criticism of care by converting peer review 
into a tool to achieve higher verdicts and settlements in individual cases.”).  
 146. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.  
 147. Mike Segal, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: What’s Going on Here?, BROAD & CASSEL, 
http://www.broadandcassel.com/articles/Mike%20Segal%20Medical%20Malpractice.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2012). 
 148. Fassy v. Crowley, 884 So. 2d 359, 370 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 149. See Segal, supra note 147, at 1; see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 1, at 496; Mark V. 
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premiums, healthcare providers will likely charge higher rates for their 
services.150 Additionally, the increase in medical malpractice lawsuits has 
affected physicians’ ability to provide quality healthcare; a 2002 report 
found that 76% of physicians stated that their concern about medical 
malpractice litigation has become detrimental to their ability to provide for 
their patients.151 Therefore, it has been noted that Florida patients, 
ironically, will suffer the most from Amendment 7 because of a decrease in 
the quality of healthcare and an increase in healthcare costs.152  
III.  THE PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT (PSQIA) 
A.  History and Enactment 
Congress passed the PSQIA153 in response to the startling findings of 
the IOM Report.154 The IOM Report asserted that “the majority of medical 
errors do not result from individual recklessness or the actions of a 
particular group—this is not a ‘bad apple’ problem. More commonly, 
errors are caused by faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead 
people to make mistakes or fail to prevent them.”155 In order to address 
these systemic flaws, the report recommended that healthcare organizations 
“develop and participate in voluntary reporting systems” nationwide.156 
Thus, the release of the IOM Report in 1999 fueled the debate about the 
need for a patient safety law.157  
                                                                                                                     
Pauly, Who Pays when Malpractice Premiums Rise?, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 71, 71 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006); Sullivan & Anderson, 
supra note 40, at 41–42 (describing a debate regarding the degree to which medical malpractice 
litigation has added substantial clinical and transactional costs). As a result of the recent spike in 
medical malpractice insurance premiums, many physicians throughout the state have chosen to go 
“bare” by practicing without insurance. Segal, supra note 147, at 1.  
 150. See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, The High Cost of Medical Malpractice, REAL CLEAR 
MARKETS (Aug. 6, 2009), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2009/08/06/the_high_cost_of 
_medical_malpractice_97346.html; Anne Underwood, Would Tort Reform Lower Costs?, N.Y. 
TIMES: PRESCRIPTIONS BLOG (Aug. 31, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/200 
9/08/31/would-tort-reform-lower-health-care-costs/ (describing an agreement between Senators 
Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and John Kerry (D-MA) that medical malpractice lawsuits are increasing 
healthcare costs). But see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 3 (2005) (stating that 
“the real costs of medical malpractice” are not due to litigation, but are a result of malpractice 
victims’ lost lives, medical expenses, and time out of work).  
 151. FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 133, at 8.  
 152. See Sawran & Weill, supra note 20, at 10.  
 153. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 
(2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006)).  
 154. See Douglas B. Dotan, Patient Safety Organizations: A New Paradigm in Quality 
Management and Communication Systems in Healthcare, 34 J. CLINICAL ENGINEERING 142, 142–43 
(2009). For the IOM Report’s findings, see supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.  
 155. TO ERR IS HUMAN SUMMARY, supra note 6, at 2.  
 156. Id. at 3.  
 157. See Bell, supra note 38, at 761.  
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In 2000, Senator James Jeffords, an independent from Vermont, 
introduced a patient safety law called the Patient Safety and Errors 
Reduction Act.158 However, that Act failed to pass both houses.159 In 2005, 
Senator Jeffords sponsored the PSQIA;160 it was signed into law on July 
29, 2005.161 Despite a general acknowledgement of the value of the 
PSQIA, skeptics questioned the Act’s ability to achieve its proposed 
goals.162 These concerns regarded the PSQIA’s lack of firm requirements 
ensuring the protection of confidential information, the high financial and 
administrative costs of implementation, and the unclear relationship 
between federal and state patient safety legislation.163 Despite this 
skepticism, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) published the final 
rule implementing the PSQIA on November 21, 2008.164 The Act then 
became effective on January 19, 2009.165  
Congress enacted the PSQIA to promote “a learning environment that 
is needed to move beyond the existing culture of blame and punishment 
that suppresses information about healthcare errors to a ‘culture of safety’ 
that focuses on information sharing, improved patient safety and quality 
and the prevention of future medical errors.”166 Through the PSQIA, 
Congress sought to improve patient safety and reduce the prevalence of 
adverse medical incidents by encouraging voluntary peer review 
participation167 without the fear of legal disclosure.168 The IOM Report 
                                                                                                                     
 158. See Robert A. Kerr, Note, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: Who 
Should Pay for Improved Conditions?, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 319, 328 (2007); see also S. 2738, 
106th Cong. (2000).  
 159. See Kerr, supra note 158, at 328.  
 160. S. 544: Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, GOVTRACK.US., 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-544 (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
 161. See Key, supra note 7, at 24 (citing Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006))). 
The PSQIA “received bipartisan support each year it was presented to Congress.” Kerr, supra note 
158, at 327.  
 162. Mark A. Kadzielski & Lynsey A. Mitchel, An Analysis of the New Federal Patient Safety 
Law and Final Rule, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 5, 6. Much of this 
skepticism occurred after the proposed rule implementing the Act was published on February 12, 
2008. Id. at 6. Beginning February 12, 2008, and ending April 14, 2008 (the public notice-and-
comment period), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided sixty days for 
public feedback and suggestions for revisions to the proposed rule. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Patient Safety & Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified at 
42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009)).  
 165. Id. 
 166. KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010) 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 3 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 167. See id.  
 168. See Carolyn M. Clancy, New Patient Safety Organizations Lower Roadblocks to Medical 
Error Reporting, 23 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 318, 319 (2008). 
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stated that the prevalence of medical errors could be explained by 
healthcare providers’ reluctance to identify errors due to a fear that such 
information would be used against them in medical malpractice lawsuits.169 
Additional fears include adverse action by hospital disciplinary staff and 
licensing boards, as well as potential injury to providers’ reputations.170 
The PSQIA thus provides that data reported to a PSO are confidential and 
privileged.171 Healthcare providers may create internal patient safety 
evaluation systems (PSES) to facilitate the collection and analysis of 
patient safety event data and can voluntarily report this information to a 
PSO.172 By providing privilege and confidentiality protections through the 
PSQIA, Congress envisioned a patient safety network that provides 
interactive and evidence-based information to enable healthcare providers 
to analyze and provide insight into patient safety events and systemic 
failures.173  
B.  The Creation of Patient Safety Organizations and the Network of 
Patient Safety Databases 
A major objective of the PSQIA is the creation of PSOs. As a private 
or public entity or a component of another organization (a component 
organization), a PSO’s primary purpose is to conduct activities that 
improve healthcare quality and patient safety.174 A PSO must be certified 
and listed by the AHRQ.175 A listing lasts for three years; in order to 
remain a PSO, the organization must apply for recertification.176 However, 
certain entities cannot qualify as a PSO;177 excluded entities include any 
health insurance issuer or component of an insurance issuer and any 
healthcare oversight entity, such as an accreditation or licensing entity.178 
A “provider” is defined as an individual or entity licensed by a state to 
provide healthcare services.179 A PSO must work with more than one 
provider.180 There are approximately eighty listed PSOs in roughly thirty 
                                                                                                                     
 169. See TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 1, at 109–12.  
 170.  See Key, supra note 7, at 24. 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a)–(b) (2006); 42 C.F.R. §§ 3.204(a), 3.206(a) (2010); see also 
Kadzielski & Mitchel, supra note 162, at 5.  
 172. See Kadzielski & Mitchel, supra note 162, at 5.  
 173. See id.  
 174. See Patient Safety Organizations Fast Facts, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/psos/fastfacts.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) [hereinafter PSO Fast 
Facts]; see also Key, supra note 7, at 25.  
 175. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.  
 176. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(a)(2) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(a)(3) (2010).  
 177. Id. § 3.102(a)(2).  
 178. See id.; see also Key, supra note 7, at 25.  
 179. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010). Examples of providers include hospitals, nursing facilities, 
physicians, physician assistants, registered nurses, physical or occupational therapists, pharmacists, 
and certified social workers. Id.  
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(b)(1)(C); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b)(2)(i)(C); see also Dotan, supra note 
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states and the District of Columbia.181 
In order to qualify as a PSO, an entity must meet fifteen general 
certification requirements.182 These are divided into eight patient safety 
activities and seven PSO criteria.183 The eight patient safety activities are:  
(1) Efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of 
health care delivery; 
(2) The collection and analysis of patient safety work 
product; 
(3) The development and dissemination of information 
with respect to improving patient safety, such as 
recommendations, protocols, or information regarding best 
practices; 
(4) The utilization of patient safety work product for the 
purposes of encouraging a culture of safety and of providing 
feedback and assistance to effectively minimize patient risk; 
(5) The maintenance of procedures to preserve 
confidentiality with respect to patient safety work product; 
(6) The provision of appropriate security measures with 
respect to patient safety work product; 
(7) The utilization of qualified staff; and 
(8) Activities related to the operation of a patient safety 
evaluation system and to the provision of feedback to 
participants in a patient safety evaluation system.184 
An entity must also certify the following seven PSO criteria:  
(1) The mission and primary activity of the organization 
are to conduct activities to promote patient safety and 
improve the quality of health care delivery; 
(2) The organization must demonstrate that it has 
appropriately qualified staff; 
(3) It must show that it has contracts with more than one 
provider to receive and review PSWP; 
(4) It must not be a health insurance issuer; 
                                                                                                                     
154, at 144. The multiple healthcare provider requirement guarantees that patient safety event 
information is, in fact, being exchanged and analyzed in order for one provider to learn from 
another provider’s experiences. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 319.  
 181. Geographic Directory, supra note 14.  
 182. 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b).  
 183. Id.  
 184. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010).  
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(5) It must disclose any financial, reporting, or contractual 
relationship with providers, and whether it is managed, 
controlled, and operated independently from any provider that 
contracts with the entity; 
(6) It must show that it collects PSWP in a standardized 
manner; and 
(7) It must show that it uses PSWP to provide direct 
feedback and assistance to providers.185 
In addition to the fifteen general PSO requirements, an organization 
must also certify that it will (1) keep patient safety work product 
(PSWP)186 separate from the parent organization; (2) not make any 
unauthorized disclosures to the parent organization; and (3) not be in a 
conflict of interest with the parent organization.187 The AHRQ is 
responsible for administering the certification process for a PSO listing and 
verifying that a PSO has met its requirements.188 The AHRQ works with a 
PSO to help resolve compliance issues in order to avoid revoking a PSO’s 
listing.189 However, if a PSO does not comply with the PSQIA 
requirements, the AHRQ may revoke that PSO’s listing.190  
The PSQIA additionally calls for the creation of a Network of Patient 
Safety Databases (NPSD) in order to aggregate, analyze, and archive 
patient safety information received from PSOs.191 The NPSD’s goal “is to 
facilitate aggregation and analyses of patient safety event information to 
help reduce adverse events and improve healthcare quality.”192 PSOs and 
other entities, such as HHS and the Center for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, will voluntarily contribute non-identifiable PSWP to the 
NPSD.193 The NPSD’s findings will be reported to Congress in the 
AHRQ’s annual National Healthcare Quality Report.194 In order to 
facilitate the sharing of information, data in the NPSD will conform to 
                                                                                                                     
 185. 42 U.S.C. 299b-24(b)(1); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(b)(2)(i); see also Key, supra note 7, at 27. 
 186. See infra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (defining PSWP).  
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-24(b)(2); 42 C.F.R. § 3.102(c)(2); see also Key, supra note 7, at 27.  
 188. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.  
 189. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 320.  
 190. Id. As of early 2012 , there were thirty-three delisted PSOs. One PSO was delisted for 
cause, and one PSO was delisted for expired listing. However, the rest of the delisted PSOs 
voluntarily relinquished their listing. Delisted Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/delisted/delistedpsos.htm (last visited Jan. 
21, 2012). 
 191. See Network of Patient Safety Databases, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/npsd/npsd.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); see also Dotan, supra note 
154, at 143–44.  
 192. Network of Patient Safety Databases, supra note 191.  
 193. See id.; see also Dotan, supra note 154, at 144.  
 194. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320.  
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“common formats”—standardized definitions and reporting formats.195 
The AHRQ initially anticipated that the NPSD would begin to receive PSO 
information in 2010,196 yet in January 2010 it reported that the database 
would not launch before February 2011.197 AHRQ is expected to release a 
report featuring NPSD information in 2012.198 As the number of PSOs 
continues to grow and they begin to submit their patient safety information 
to the NPSD, the PSQIA will help increase the quality of healthcare by 
analyzing trends in the delivery of care locally, regionally, and nationally.  
C.  Patient Safety Work Product and Patient Safety Evaluation Systems: 
Privilege and Confidentiality Protections 
PSWP is “any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root 
cause analyses), or written or oral statements” which: (1) are assembled or 
created by a provider for PSO reporting and are reported to a PSO; (2) are 
developed by a PSO in order to conduct patient safety activities; or (3) 
identify the analysis of a PSES.199 PSWP does not include a patient’s 
original patient, provider, medical record, billing, or discharge 
information.200 Nor does a PSWP include information that is collected or 
maintained separately from a PSES.201  
PSWP is submitted to a provider’s patient safety evaluation system 
(PSES).202 A PSES is “the collection, management, or analysis of 
information for reporting to or by a [PSO].”203 A provider’s PSES is a 
separate and secure physical and electronic space from the provider’s 
internal risk management, which clearly specifies how and when a provider 
will report information to its PSO and how such communication will 
occur.204 PSWP may be removed from a PSES before it has been reported 
to a PSO; after PSWP has been removed, it is no longer protected under 
the PSQIA.205  
                                                                                                                     
 195. See Network of Patient Safety Databases, supra note 191.  
 196. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. 
 197. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-281, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES: PATIENT SAFETY ACT: HHS IS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE ACT, SO ITS 
EFFECTIVENESS CANNOT YET BE EVALUATED 13 (2010). 
 198. UHC Patient Safety Organization Featured in National Quality Forum State-Based 
Reporting Group, UHC NEWS (Feb. 2011), https://www.uhc.edu/38712.htm. 
 199. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010). 
 200. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20. 
 201. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, THE PHYSICIAN’S 
GUIDE TO PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS 21 (2009), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/370/patient-safety-organizations.pdf (illustrating the separation 
between a provider’s internal risk-management system and PSES).  
 202. See AM. MED. ASS’N , supra note 201, at 10–11, 21.  
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(6); 42 C.F.R. § 3.20. 
 204. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 10, 21 (illustrating the separation between a 
provider’s internal risk-management system and PSES). 
 205. Id. at 14; see also 42 C.F.R. § 3.20.  
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The PSQIA provides privilege protections to PSWP.206 PSWP is not 
discoverable pursuant to a federal or state “civil, criminal or administrative 
subpoena or order.”207 Additionally, PSWP is neither discoverable nor 
admissible in a federal or state “civil, criminal or administrative 
proceeding,” including an “administrative proceeding against a 
provider.”208 PSWP is also inadmissible in a proceeding by a professional 
disciplinary board authorized by state law.209 Exceptions to PSWP 
privilege are permitted for the disclosure: (1) of PSWP relevant to a 
criminal proceeding; 210 (2) “to provide equitable relief in a private cause of 
action”;211 (3) after receiving authorization from each provider;212 and (4) 
“of non-identifiable PSWP.”213 PSWP privilege under the PSQIA is 
determined and enforced by the court in which the PSWP evidence is 
presented.214 The PSQIA is not a broad federal peer review privilege; 
instead, Congress created a limited and narrow exception for peer review 
privilege for PSWP created under PSOs.215  
 In addition to privilege protections, the PSQIA also provides  
confidentiality protections. PSWP is confidential and not subject to 
disclosure.216 Exceptions to PSWP confidentiality are permitted for the 
disclosure: (1) of relevant PSWP in a criminal proceeding after an in 
camera inspection by the court; (2) to provide equitable relief under the 
Public Health Act; (3) after receiving authorization from identified 
providers; (4) to perform patient safety activities; (5) of non-identifiable 
PSWP; (6) for research; (7) to the Food and Drug Administration; (8) to an 
accrediting entity; (9) for business operations; and (10) to law 
enforcement.217 If the disclosing entity is not a PSO, the disclosure of 
PSWP is not a confidentiality violation if the PSWP does not include 
information that either “assesses the quality of care of a provider” or 
“describe[s] or pertain[s] to one or more actions or failures . . . by a 
provider.”218 The Office of Civil Rights is responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of PSWP’s confidentiality protections; it 
investigates all allegations of violations based on “a complaint-driven 
                                                                                                                     
 206. 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(a).  
 207. Id. § 3.204(a)(1).  
 208. Id. § 3.204(a)(2), (a)(4).  
 209. Id. § 3.204(a)(5).  
 210. Id. § 3.204(b)(1). 
 211. Key, supra note 7, at 26; 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(2).  
 212. 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(3); see also Key, supra note 7, at 26. 
 213. Key, supra note 7, at 26; 42 C.F.R. § 3.204(b)(4). 
 214. See Key, supra note 7, at 27.  
 215. Schlegel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 2008 WL 4570619, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 
2008). 
 216. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(b) (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 3.206(a). 
 217. Id. § 3.206(b). 
 218. Id. § 3.206(c). 
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system.”219 For each disclosure of confidential PSWP, the HHS Secretary 
may impose a civil penalty of up to $10,000 against any PSO, provider, or 
individual.220 While a PSO must also comply with HIPAA requirements,221 
the same violation for a disclosure of confidential information cannot cause 
a PSO to be subject to penalties under both the PSQIA and HIPAA.222  
 If PSWP has been disclosed, it remains privileged and confidential 
unless the disclosure is in a criminal proceeding (in which case PSWP is 
still privileged, but is no longer confidential) or the disclosure is of non-
identifiable PSWP (in which case PSWP is no longer privileged or 
confidential).223 PSQIA privilege protections preempt all federal, state, and 
local laws that would otherwise limit the protection of PSWP; however, 
any federal, state, or local law that provides more confidentiality and 
privilege protection than PSQIA is permissible.224 In contrast to the 
HCQIA’s narrow protection for peer review activities affecting individual 
physicians, the PSQIA provides a broad protection for all PSWP.225  
D.  The Judicial Response to and the Future of the PSQIA 
Since 2005, few cases have involved the PSQIA. In 2008, in a 
California case, Schlegel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan et al.,226 the 
defendant healthcare company argued that the PSQIA created a broad 
federal peer review privilege and objected to the plaintiff’s request for 
production of peer review documents relating to an investigation of the 
defendant’s transplant program.227 The court stated that the PSQIA created 
a limited, narrow exception for peer review privilege for PSWP; it is not “a 
broad federal peer review privilege.”228 The court refused to apply the 
PSQIA’s privilege protections because there was no evidence that the 
contested documents were prepared for or reported to a PSO by the 
defendant. The court additionally pointed out that none of the defendant 
entities was a listed PSO itself.229  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 219. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. A complaint must be filed with the HHS Secretary  
within 180 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of a violation. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 3.306. There is a six-year statute of limitations for a violation under the PSQIA. Id. § 3.414.  
 220. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. 
 221. Id. 
 222. 42 C.F.R. § 3.418.  
 223. Id. § 3.208.  
 224. Key, supra note 7, at 26. 
 225. See KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–96 (D. Del. 
2010).  
 226. 2008 WL 4570619, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008).  
 227. Id. at *1–2.  
 228. Id. at *3.  
 229. Id.  
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In contrast, a Delaware court, in KD ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United 
States,230 prevented the disclosure of peer review documents by the 
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute of the National Institutes of 
Health even though the review bodies may not have met “the technical 
requirements for listing as PSOs.”231 That court reasoned even if the 
defendant review bodies did not meet the technical requirements for a 
listed PSO, “they clearly perform the same functions Congress intended the 
PSQIA to encourage.”232 The court further explained that the defendant’s 
review process “collects the same kind of safety data as enumerated in the 
PSQIA, within the same organizational structure, to accomplish the same 
goal (i.e., ensuring participant safety and effectiveness of care).”233 
Additionally, the Dieffenbach court stated that, as compared to the HCQIA, 
the PSQIA “announces a more general approval of the medical peer review 
process and more sweeping evidentiary protections for materials used 
therein.”234 The court explained that while the HCQIA was created to 
restrict physicians from moving across states without disclosing their 
previous performances, the PSQIA was implemented to address 
healthcare’s systemic weaknesses that result in preventable adverse 
medical incidents.235  
While PSQIA case law currently remains limited, litigation involving 
the PSQIA will likely increase in the coming years due to the growing 
number of PSOs.236 PSOs have recently been listed as one of the top ten 
issues in health law.237 As the scope of the PSQIA remains undecided 
within the judicial system, the functioning and application of the PSQIA is 
in the hands of healthcare providers.238 Joining a PSO and submitting 
information to the NPSD are voluntary acts.239 Therefore, for the PSQIA to 
have a beneficial effect on the healthcare system, healthcare providers must 
actively participate by willingly submitting patient safety information and 
learning from the data to improve the quality of healthcare.240 
 
                                                                                                                     
 230. 715 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Del. 2010). 
 231. Id. at 588–90, 596–98.  
 232. Id. at 596.  
 233. Id. at 597.  
 234. Id. at 595.  
 235. Id.  
 236. See supra text accompanying note 181 (describing the approximate number of listed 
PSOs).  
 237. Molly Merrill, Top 10 Health Law Issues for 2010, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Feb. 19, 
2010), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/top-ten-health-law-issues-2010. 
 238. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 319 (“Health care providers will make the key decisions 
about how this system will work in practice.”).  
 239.  Id. at 319. Providers also choose what information they will submit to a PSO or the 
NPSD. Id.  
 240.  Id. at 319–20. 
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IV.  WILL THE PSQIA BE THE CURE TO AMENDMENT 7? 
A.  Amendment 7 and the PSQIA 
Although Amendment 7 remains in full effect, Florida healthcare 
practitioners are well aware that the scope of its application is limited to 
records.241 Amendment 7 has not removed many of the legal protections 
against disclosure of peer reviewers’ identity, compelling of testimony, and 
use of litigation information.242 Yet, the peer review process in Florida 
remains in potential peril.   
Effective confidentiality and privilege protections are essential to peer 
review reporting in order to address medical errors.243 Thus, critics of 
Amendment 7 suggest that the PSQIA may provide protection from 
Amendment 7’s broad scope.244 Still, the interplay between Amendment 7 
and the PSQIA remains unknown.245 While Amendment 7 has been 
(unsuccessfully) challenged based on federal preemption, these federal 
claims included alleged conflict with the HCQIA, the Contracts Clause, 
and HIPAA; however, Amendment 7 has not yet been challenged as being 
federally preempted by the PSQIA.246 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 11–12.  
 242. Memorandum, Benedict & Assoc., Inc., Peer Review in Florida Since Constitutional 
Amendment 7 Passed, available at http://www.benedictriskmanagement.com/docs/Peer_review_060 
62006.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
 243. See Key, supra note 7, at 27. 
 244. See Coombs, supra note 23, at 418 (“[T]he Patient Safety & Quality Improvement Act of 
2005 may provide federal protection against discoverability for at least some of these records.”); see 
also Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 12 (“[The PSQIA] could form the basis for a preemptive 
challenge to Amendment 7.”); Yaeger, supra note 33, at 149 (“Since the passage of Amendment 7, 
more hospitals may choose to voluntarily report patient safety work product to patient safety 
organizations to benefit from the federal privilege and confidentiality.”); The Amendment 7 
Challenge, supra note 116 (asking whether a PSO is hype or hope in reference to Amendment 7); 
Florida Peer Review After Amendment 7, supra note 49, at 3 (“[H]ospitals and hospital systems 
should consider establishing their own PSO to receive their PSWP.”); Welcome, MED. PEER REV. 
RES., LLC, http://www.medicalpeerreviewresource.com/index.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) 
[hereinafter MPRR] (“The PSO can provide Florida physicians and healthcare providers with 
[Amendment 7] protection.”).  
 245. While the interplay between Amendment 7 and PSQIA has not yet been determined in the 
courts, the Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC PSO states on its website that “all patient safety 
work product is privileged and confidential under federal law, which trumps state law, including 
Amendment 7.” MPRR, supra note 244. 
 246. See Columbia Hosp. Corp. of S. Broward v. Fain, 16 So. 3d 236, 241–44 (Fla. 4th Dist. 
Ct. App. 2009); see also W. Fla. Reg. Med. Ctr. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676, 684–88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 20–26, 37–40, Fla. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Viamonte, 2008 WL 5101755 (N.D. Fla. July 10, 2008) (No. 4:08-cv-312-RH/WCS), ECF No. 1; 
Harris, supra note 26, at 27 n.77. 
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B.  How to Become a Patient Safety Organization in Florida 
The AHRQ accepts applications for PSO listings at any time; there is 
no application deadline.247 Applicants are able to access all of the requisite 
forms and information from the AHRQ website.248 An applicant can either 
join an existing PSO or create a new PSO by joining with other entities. Of 
the approximate eighty listed PSOs, there are about eight in Florida.249 
However, this does not mean that Florida healthcare providers are 
restricted to joining a Florida PSO as PSOs are composed of members 
from various states.250 
The PSQIA creates confidentiality and privilege protections for PSWP 
submitted to a PSO.251 However, if the PSWP contains any information 
that must be reported to the state, then that information cannot be protected 
under the PSQIA.252 Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 395.0197, a 
licensed facility’s internal risk-management program is required to submit 
adverse incident reports to the Agency for Health Care Administration: 
annually, for certain categories of incidents (annual reports); and within 
fifteen days of the occurrence, for other statutorily defined incidents (Code 
15 reports).253 Therefore, neither annual reports nor Code 15 reports are 
protected as PSWP under the PSQIA, even if they are submitted to a 
PSO.254 In contrast, while both Florida255 and the Joint Commission256 
require that healthcare providers have a peer review system, the state does 
not require the reporting of peer review documents,257 which thus remain 
protected as PSWP. Therefore, when creating a PSO in Florida, it is 
important to recognize that Code 15 and annual adverse incident reports 
are not protected PSWP and that the PSES is a separate system from the 
                                                                                                                     
 247. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174.  
 248. See Patient Safety Organization Forms, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/psoforms.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012); see also Patient Safety 
Organization Listing Information, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, 
http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/listprocess.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).  
 249. Geographic Directory, supra note 14. 
 250. For instance, the UHC Patient Safety Net (PSN) PSO has approximately 100 participating 
organizations and more than 800 nationwide “Patient Safety Leaders” on its “PSN 
Quality/Risk/Safety Listserve.” Highlights of the Patient Safety Net Program, UNITED HEALTH SYS. 
CONSORTIUM, https://www.uhc.edu/docs/49013841_PSNhighlights.pdf (last visted Sept. 25, 2011). 
Officially listed on November 5, 2008, and registered in Illinois, UHC PSN is a component entity of 
the University HealthSystem Consortium. Geographic Directory, supra note 14. 
 251. See supra Section III.C.  
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B) (2006).  
 253. FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(6)–(7); see also Reporting, FLA. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 
ADMIN., http://www.fdhc.state.fl.us/SCHS/risk/reporting.shtml (last updated Jan. 31, 2011).  
 254. See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7).  
 255. FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(2). 
 256. See supra Part I.  
 257. See FLA. STAT. § 395.0193(2).  
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state-mandated internal risk-management program.258 
C.  Why Florida Healthcare Providers Should Join Patient Safety 
Organizations 
More than ten years after the publication of the IOM Report, the need 
to address patient safety events remains vital. Recent studies indicate that 
the number of adverse events has increased.259 A 2002 study stated that an 
estimated 8.1 million Americans have “experienced a serious medical or 
drug error.”260 As of 2010, one in seven hospitalized Medicare patients 
experienced an adverse medical event; these events cause approximately 
180,000 deaths a year.261 In November 2010, a study of ten North Carolina 
hospitals reported, “[H]arms remain common, with little evidence of 
widespread improvement. Further efforts are needed to translate effective 
safety interventions into routine practice and to monitor healthcare safety 
over time.”262 Dr. Carolyn M. Clancy, director of the AHRQ since 2003, 
explained that the increase of adverse events is partly due to better tracking 
and broader definitions of what are preventable incidents.263 Since the 
publication of the IOM Report, healthcare providers have taken measures 
to improve patient safety.264 
One way that Florida healthcare providers can address the prevalence 
of adverse events is by joining a PSO. As more Florida providers join the 
approximately eight listed Florida PSOs and the other PSOs listed outside 
of Florida,265 the quality of healthcare across the state will likely increase 
because providers will no longer be afraid to participate in the peer review 
process. If their adverse medical incident reports are PSWP under a listed 
PSO, such reports would no longer be subject to Amendment 7. Florida 
providers under a PSO will be able to engage in the type of candid, 
specialized medical evaluation favored by the Holly and Cruger courts.266 
The PSQIA provides PSWP protections in order to remove barriers, such 
as Amendment 7, “that can deter the participation of health care providers 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 21 (illustrating a depiction of the flow of 
information between an internal risk-management program and a PSES).  
 259. Manoj Jain, Focus on Patient Safety Hasn’t Succeeded, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2010, at 
E05.  
 260. New Study Estimates Eight Million American Families Experienced a Serious Medical or 
Drug Error, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 15, 2002), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/ 
News/News-Releases/2002/Apr/New-Study-Estimates-Eight-Million-American-Families-Experie 
nced-A-Serious-Medical-Or-Drug-Error.aspx. 
 261. Jain, supra note 259. 
 262. Christopher P. Landrigan et al., Temporal Trends in Rates of Patient Harm Resulting 
from Medical Care, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2124, 2124 (2010). 
 263. Jain, supra note 259. 
 264. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 318; see also Jain, supra note 259. 
 265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra Section II.A (discussing Holly and Cruger). 
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in patient safety and quality improvement initiatives, such as fear of legal 
liability or professional sanctions.”267 However, a healthcare provider 
cannot merely join a PSO in order to avoid falling under Amendment 7. 
The primary mission and activity of a PSO must be to conduct activities to 
improve healthcare quality and patient safety.268 A PSO should not be 
viewed simply as a method to avoid Amendment 7; instead, healthcare 
providers across Florida should join PSOs to counteract Amendment 7’s 
effect on the peer review process. By sharing patient safety information 
through the protections of a PSO, the quality of healthcare can be increased 
throughout the state.  
Thus, by joining a PSO, Florida healthcare providers will improve the 
quality of healthcare not only by protecting the peer review process, but 
also by analyzing and aggregating information submitted to PSOs. Dr. 
Clancy described two roadblocks that have hindered the improvement of 
the quality of healthcare since the IOM Report: the lack of uniform federal 
confidentiality and privilege standards regarding patient safety event 
information;269 and the inability of healthcare providers to share patient 
safety data with other providers—locally, regionally and nationally—to 
identify and analyze trends in order to reduce adverse medical events.270 
The PSQIA addresses these two roadblocks by creating federal 
confidentiality and privilege protections for PSWP as well as information-
sharing entities through individual PSOs and the NPSD.  
Similar to peer review’s use of medical expert evaluation, PSOs also 
supply analysis and evaluation of patient safety events by medical 
experts.271 The exchange of information within a PSO offers providers an 
outside perspective on other providers’ systemic flaws; the peer review 
process—conducted internally, within a provider’s system—is generally 
unable to facilitate the same. Participation in a PSO enables providers to 
learn from the experiences of other providers.272 Submitted information 
can be aggregated to develop an understanding of the underlying causes 
and trends of adverse events and near-misses at a local, regional, and 
national level.273 For instance, the Illinois-based Society for Vascular 
Surgery (SVS) PSO274 shares patient safety information between regional 
                                                                                                                     
 267. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. 
 268. See supra Section III.B. 
 269. Clancy, supra note 168, at 318. Dr. Clancy further explained that state peer review 
protections are limited or nonexistent (as in Florida); thus, the fluctuating degree of protection has 
contributed to the fear of liability and sanctions among healthcare providers. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. 
 272. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 3; see also Clancy, supra note 168, at 319 (“This 
continuous confidential flow of information will serve an important educational role for individual 
and multiple organizations.”). 
 273. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320; see also PSO Fast Facts, supra note 174. 
 274. Geographic Directory, supra note 14. As a specialty-based PSO, the SVS PSO enables 
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groups, including Carolinas Vascular Study Group, Florida Vascular Study 
Group, Mid-Atlantic Vascular Study Group, Southern California Vascular 
Study Group, Southern Vascular Outcomes Network, and Vascular Study 
Group of New England.275 Therefore, a PSO is essentially a “learning 
organization” that applies acquired knowledge to help the organization 
adapt to change276 by promoting the sharing of patient safety data outside 
of a provider’s own system on a larger geographic scale. 
Admittedly, joining a PSO presents some disadvantages. For instance, 
once information is placed in a PSO, it can no longer be removed.277 This 
inability to retrieve PSO-submitted PSWP is especially critical to a 
physician who sues after the loss of privileges following a peer review 
committee review; the physician will be unable to access the document in 
order to defend against the committee’s allegations.278 Additionally, the 
terminating committee is unable to use its findings in the peer review 
document to support its decision to terminate the physician’s privileges. 
The protection of PSWP submitted to a PSO will also limit a physician’s 
ability to defend with PSWP in a medical malpractice lawsuit.279 
Furthermore, this inability to retrieve documents submitted to a PSO has 
dramatic implications in combination with Florida’s “Three Strikes” 
Amendment, which mandates revocation of a physician’s license following 
three or more instances of medical malpractice.280 The PSQIA is silent on 
how long PSWP can remain in a PSES; thus, healthcare providers can wait 
months or even years before submitting patient safety event information to 
a PSO.281 The information is still protected PSWP because it is located 
within a PSES.282 However, withholding information from a PSO can 
delay the analysis of current information.  
                                                                                                                     
the sharing of data from specific vascular treatments. See SVS PSO, VASCULARWEB (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.vascularweb.org/practiceresources/svs-pso/Pages/SVS-PSO.aspx [hereinafter SVS 
PSO]. 
 275. SVS PSO, supra note 274. 
 276. Dotan, supra note 154, at 142. 
 277. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2010); AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 14. 
 278. This disadvantage is a similar argument used by peer review critics. See supra Section 
II.D.  
 279. See supra Section II.D.  
 280. See supra note 24.  
 281. Florida healthcare providers can be guided by the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations and statute of repose in determining when a provider may need to access the submitted 
materials in order to defend itself in a medical malpractice lawsuit. See FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b). 
However, because Amendment 7’s application has been upheld in lawsuits other than medical 
malpractice, such as a lawsuit for defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship 
in Amisub North Ridge Hospital, Inc. v. Sonaglia, 995 So. 2d 999, 1000–01 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 
2008), healthcare providers should not rely fully on the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
and statute of repose.  
 282. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 201, at 21.  
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Additionally, PSOs are not federally funded283 and forming or joining a 
PSO can be expensive. For instance, the Patient Safety Organization of 
Florida, Inc., requires an annual subscription fee of $35.00 per licensed 
bed.284 Additional costs for joining a PSO include the hiring and training of 
PSO staff and the creation of facilities for storing PSWP. Because 
providers within a PSO may not have the same reporting databases or 
software, PSOs may also incur costs related to the common formatting of 
PSESs. In order to address this problem, the members of Clarity PSO use 
Healthcare SafetyZone Portal.285 While the use of the same software 
addresses common formatting issues, it also increases costs for joining a 
PSO because a healthcare provider must incur costs for purchasing the 
software and training staff. 
Despite these costs, PSOs foster a “learning organization” in which 
healthcare providers can learn from their mistakes and from the mistakes 
of others.286 While Amendment 7 has become an obstacle to peer review’s 
effectiveness and Florida providers’ ability to analyze and learn from 
patient safety events, PSOs offer an alternative route to ensure the quality 
of healthcare. Through the sharing of patient safety event information 
between providers within PSOs and the NSPD, Florida providers will be 
able to counteract Amendment 7 and guarantee that the exchange of this 
data continues. As a result, there will likely be fewer adverse medical 
incidents and thus fewer medical malpractice lawsuits,287 resulting in 
reduced court costs, reduced attorney’s fees, fewer settlements, and lower 
medical malpractice premiums. As consumer patients, Floridians will 
benefit from reduced medical costs and increased quality of healthcare.  
CONCLUSION 
The full effect of the PSQIA on the quality of healthcare has yet to be 
determined. As the number of PSOs continues to increase and the level of 
interaction between PSOs and the NPSD continues to grow, the assessment 
of patient safety information will foster a learning environment among 
healthcare providers. Recognizing the need for development, Dr. Clancy 
stated, “The AHRQ expects that health providers and PSOs will climb a 
                                                                                                                     
 283. See Kerr, supra note 158, at 323.  
 284. Memorandum from Bruce Rueben, President, Fla. Hosp. Ass’n, and Linda Quick, 
President, S. Fla. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass’n, to Hospital Executive (Sept. 21, 2009), available at 
www.psoflorida.com/files/PSO-ExecutiveLtr0809.doc. 
 285. See Healthcare SafetyZone Portal, CLARITY GRP., INC., http://www.claritygrp.com/media/ 
3783/portal_brochure_2011_-_4_sep._pages.pdf; Clarity PSO, CLARITY GRP., INC., http://www.cla 
ritygrp.com/media/9623/claritypsobrochure2011.pdf. 
 286. Dotan, supra note 154, at 142–44, 146. 
 287. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 46 (“When hospital conditions and patient 
care improve and the rates of death and disease decline, the number of medical malpractice lawsuits 
should decline.”). 
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steep learning curve as they become familiar with this new mechanism.”288  
In the meantime, Amendment 7 remains in effect and continues to 
broaden its scope into the once-privileged and confidential peer review 
process. Because the Florida Supreme Court firmly ratified Amendment 
7,289 Florida healthcare providers’ best hope is for a successful amendment 
to repeal Amendment 7 in the near future.290 Otherwise, providers can 
counteract Amendment 7 and ensure the quality of healthcare for Florida 
patients by joining a PSO and participating in the NPSD. Thus, the 
“chilling” caused by a lack of confidentiality and privilege protections for 
peer review documents may be warmed up for providers who participate in 
PSOs and submit peer review as PSWP. However, preventable adverse 
medical errors and near-misses may not be effectively analyzed and 
addressed through the peer review process in Florida unless providers incur 
the costs of joining a PSO. There may be other methods to avoid the broad 
reach of Amendment 7. For instance, some suggest that the closer 
involvement of attorneys in the peer review process could bring peer 
review records under the protection of the attorney-client privilege or 
work-product doctrine.291 Additional suggestions to help the peer review 
process adapt to Amendment 7 include: substituting written documents 
with oral discussions; including only facts in incident reports and 
eliminating all commentary; and deleting negative language in peer review 
documents.292  
 
                                                                                                                     
 288. Clancy, supra note 168, at 320. Due to this learning curve, AHRQ is available for 
assistance to help PSOs. Id. 
 289. See supra Section II.C. 
 290. For example, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment for a high-speed train 
system throughout the state in the November 2000 election. November 7, 2000 General Election, 
Official Results, Constitutional Amendment, DIV. ELECTIONS, FLA. DEP’T STATE, 
http://doe.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/SummaryRpt.asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2000&Rac 
e=AMD (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Yet in 2004, then-Governor Jeb Bush endorsed an effort to 
repeal the amendment due to its immense costs. Overview, FLA. HIGH SPEED RAIL, 
http://www.floridabullettrain.com/fhsra/1_overview.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). Featured on 
the same ballot as Amendment 7 in November 2004, the repeal of the high-speed rail amendment 
was approved by the voters. 2004 Election Results, supra note 22.  
 291. Coombs, supra note 23, at 418. Yet, courts throughout Florida have held that adverse 
incident reports are not protected under the attorney work-product protection and are subject to 
discovery under Amendment 7. See Fla. Eye Clinic v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 1044, 1049–50 (Fla. 5th 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Neely ex rel. Neely, 8 So. 3d 1268, 1269–71 
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009). In Gmach, the Fifth District reasoned that when the disputed adverse 
incident reports were created, defense counsel had not yet been consulted or even involved in the 
lawsuit. The court further explained that even if the reports were created in anticipation of litigation, 
they were fact work product because they did not represent defense counsel’s opinions of the 
lawsuit. Gmach, 14 So. 3d at 1050–51. Therefore, later involvement of attorneys will not immunize 
the disclosure of adverse incident reports under Amendment 7; involvement would have to occur at 
the earlier creation stages of the reports.  
 292. See Parisi & Tsitsakis, supra note 118, at 12.  
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The coming years will demonstrate the effect of Amendment 7 on the 
peer review process in Florida. While the relationship between 
Amendment 7 and the PSQIA has yet to be fully determined, the peer 
review process in Florida still remains in potential danger even under the 
confidentiality and privilege protections of the PSQIA. The PSQIA only 
provides protection to PSWP and does not afford protection to any reports 
required under state statutes. Thus, Code 15 and annual reports pursuant to 
section 395.0197 are still under Amendment 7’s scope. Because of this 
lack of protection by the state, some commentators have advocated for the 
creation of a uniform and consistent federal peer review privilege by 
Congress. 293 However, as evidenced by the controversy surrounding the 
passage of  healthcare reform in 2010, any additional proposals to change 
the national healthcare system will likely face steadfast opposition; 
therefore, such attempts probably will not be made in the near future. In the 
meantime, the quality of healthcare for Florida patients remains at stake. 
                                                                                                                     
 293. See Clancy, supra note 168, at 318; Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 40, at 86–87.  
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